Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

S
ince 1964, 38 states and the District of Columbia have enacted lotteries. In many states lotteries were enacted with high approval ratings in statewide referenda, averaging better than 64 percent overall (La Fleur and La Fleur, 2001 ). While lotteries have proved to be a popular revenue source for state governments, the revenue generating capacity of lotteries is relatively small, accounting for just 1.2 percent and 2.4 percent of total revenues and tax revenues, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002) . Even so, the net proceeds from lottery sales are considered crucial since they are earmarked for such state programs as education, state economic development, and senior citizen welfare.
1 From a revenue portfolio perspective, lottery revenues are useful because they are generally uncorrelated with other revenue sources (Szakmary and Szakmary, 1995) . Lotteries are also considered to be one of the largest services produced by state governments (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) .
In the recent history of legalized lotteries, states have mimicked each other in adopting new games.
2 As lottery structures became richer, different lottery games started to compete with each other, with other legalized gaming within lottery states, and with similar games in contiguous states. The growing competition in the gaming industry may pose a serious threat to lottery sales across the states. In this paper we examine the determinants of lottery sales, with a special focus on border state competition. We evaluate the importance of border effects on state lottery revenues by examining the introduction of lottery programs and new lottery games within the state and in nearby states using data on lottery sales for all 55 counties in West Virginia over the 1987-2000 period. Because West Virginia is a relatively small, low-income state surrounded by larger and higher-income states, there is a potential for significant cross-border lottery shopping. In addition, the surrounding states have higher incomes and larger population bases so that they offer larger jackpots than does West Virginia. West Virginia therefore stands as an excellent case for examining the effects of lottery activity in neighboring states on revenue generating capabilities. The state government of West Virginia relies relatively heavily on its lottery revenues, and importantly a large component of revenue is generated from markets in neighboring states. West Virginia net lottery revenues accounted for 3.3 percent of total revenue and 3.7 percent of general revenue in 2001, ranking fifth in the share of net lottery revenues in total or general revenue among the U.S. States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002) .
Our approach allows us to observe county-by-county lottery sales before and after new contiguous state lottery games are introduced. Thus, we are able to measure the effects of competitive forces over time in the market for lottery games. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use panel data so as to capture the dynamic aspects of cross-border shopping. Thus our study contributes specifically to the literature on determinants of lottery sales and more broadly to the literature on cross-border shopping. We present evidence of cross-border lottery shopping: lottery introduction in Virginia and new lottery game introduction (Powerball and Big Game) in Kentucky, Virginia, and Maryland resulted in significant lottery sales reductions in West Virginia border counties. These results show that the introduction of competing games can have a significant effect on lottery revenues, particularly in states like West Virginia that rely relatively heavily on sales to consumers who live in neighboring states.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A number of studies have examined the substitution between different lottery games and between lottery and other forms of gambling. Clotfelter and Cook (1990) argued that the introduction of Lotto in many states during the 1980s did not decrease the sales of other lottery games. However, studies by Gulley and Scott (1989) and Elliott and Navin (2002) point to a strong substitution between lottery games and other forms of gambling such as pari-mutuel betting and casino gaming. Gulley and Scott (1989) showed that state lotteries have led to a decrease in average betting at thoroughbred racetracks. On the other hand, Elliott and Navin (2002) concluded that both casinos and pari-mutuel betting have negative effects on lottery revenues. According to their estimates, an additional dollar of per capita revenue from casinos decreases real lottery revenue per capita by $1.38. Even more strikingly, an additional dollar of per capita revenue from pari-mutuel betting decreases real lottery revenue per capita by $2.55. On the other hand, Kearney (2002) used data from national gambling surveys to do a difference-in-difference analysis of whether the introduction of state lotteries lead to a substitution away from other forms of gambling. The evidence from this analysis shows that state lottery introductions do not negatively affect participation in track, bingo, private or unlicensed gambling.
Studies by Davis, Filer and Moak (1992) and Alm, Mckee and Skidmore (1993) indicate that border competition is a significant factor in lottery adoption decisions of states. Davis, Filer and Moak (1992) showed that the presence of lottery programs in contiguous states is a significant factor in a state's adoption of lottery. Alm, Mckee and Skidmore (1993) concluded that while fiscal stress was an important factor in early introduction of state lotteries, border competition became a dominant factor in recent lottery enactments. In another study, Stover (1990) examined the substitution between lottery games in the context of contiguous state lotteries. He shows that similar lottery games in bordering states are substitutes for each other.
Finally, Garrett and Marsh (2002) provided evidence on both cross-border lottery shopping and its impact on lottery revenues. Using cross-sectional data on 105 Kansas counties, they first showed the presence of cross-border lottery shopping. They then estimated the revenue impact from the existence of lotteries in neighboring states, concluding that cross-border lottery shopping could account for substantial reductions in state lottery revenues. While these studies shed light on lottery adoption and lottery competition, no study has estimated the effects of interstate lottery competition using panel data to measure the effects of competitive forces over time in the market for lottery games.
Our empirical analysis measures the degree to which the introduction of new lottery games in West Virginia and its neighboring states serves to attract lottery sales away from or to a neighboring state. We also note that since lottery games are complements to other products (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) , sales tax revenues are likely to be affected as well. Thus, lottery sales and sales tax revenues in counties adjacent to states that do not offer a lottery or specific types of lottery games should be affected because the market area extends into non-lottery state territory.
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While our primary objective is to measure the degree to which lottery sales are affected by the introduction of lottery games in neighboring states, our panel data also allow us to examine the economic and demographic determinants of lottery sales. Again, the use of panel data allows us to examine how changes in these characteristics affect lottery sales.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The theoretical discussion presented above suggests that border county lottery sales are likely to decrease with the introduction of a new lottery or lottery game in a neighboring state. Similarly, since markets may extend into neighboring states, the introduction of new lottery games by West Virginia may result in relatively larger lottery sales increases in border counties. We estimate these effects using data on lottery sales for all 55 West Virginia counties over the 1987-2000 period. In order to estimate the effects of new border state lottery game introduction we must observe the introduction of a new lottery game and there must be a population base within the proximity of the shared border such that there is potential for consumers to alter their choice of shopping location. As shown in Figure 1 , the population base in each of the five bi-state regions has remained reasonably substantial from 1990 to 2000. 4 While the population base in the West Virginia-Kentucky region is considerably lower than in other regions, we note that this region has one of the highest proportions of the regional population living outside of West Virginia (see Figure 2) . 5 3 It would be interesting to empirically examine the effects of new lottery introduction on sales tax revenues, but such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 Each market region includes counties that share a common border. Note that some West Virginia counties are included in more than one region. Additionally, Figure 2 shows that in each of the bi-state regions, more than half of the population base lies in neighboring state counties. Thus, there is the potential for sales location substitution in all five regions as new lottery games come online.
As shown in Regions (1990 and 2000) Powerball in 1991, and Maryland and Virginia introduced Big Game in 1996 and 1997, respectively. In all, 17 of West Virginia's 29 border counties experienced the introduction of new lottery games in adjacent states. Data covering 55 counties over 14 years enable us to estimate the effects of competing lottery and lottery game introduction in neighboring states relative to interior counties and other border counties that did not experience competing lottery game introduction. Figure 3 shows a map of West Virginia and the bordering region with major cities and major highways indicated on the map. The map compares lottery sales per capita across counties in year 2000 with darker colors representing higher sales. We see evidence of concentration of lottery sales in border counties, particularly in counties that are close to population centers like Pittsburgh and Washington D.C.
To isolate the effects of lottery game introduction in neighboring states, we control for fixed county-effects as well as time-effects. The fixed-effects estimation procedure is described in detail below. In addition, we control for changing economic and demographic conditions within the county by including county per capita income, the unemployment rate, the proportion of the population over the age of 65, the proportion of the population that is male, and the proportion of the population that is nonwhite in the regression analysis. Summary statistics for these and all other variables used in the estimations are presented in Table 2 . Table 3 provides detailed definitions and sources of all variables used in the analysis. We expect the relationship between per capita income and lottery sales to be generally positive. Mikesell (1994) finds the relationship to be positive and statistically significant and estimates a high income elasticity of 3.9. However, since the purchase of a lottery ticket enables a person to buy a chance at wealth, sales may conceivably increase as income falls. We therefore also include the rate of unemployment as a control. Mikesell (1994) finds the relationship between unemployment and lottery sales to be positive and significant, although the estimated magnitude is much smaller relative to estimated effect of income. We expect that a county with a growing elderly population will experience reduced lottery sales, given that lottery play is known to be higher among adults in their middle years than when young (18-25) or old (65 and over) (Clotfelter and Cook, 1990) . Clotfelter and Cook (1989) also show that heavy bettors are likely to be male and African American or Hispanic. We therefore expect lottery sales to increase with an increase in the proportion of the population that is male and minority. 
1996 1994* *Video lottery was introduced in racetracks in the following West Virginia counties: Ohio (1994), Hancock (1994) , Kanawha (1994), and Jefferson (1997) . Since late 2001, video lottery machines are also allowed in adult settings such as bars and clubs. The introduction of video lottery in four West Virginia counties (Ohio [1994] , Hancock [1994] , Kanawha [1994], and Jefferson [1997] ) may have also affected traditional lottery game 7 sales, but the expected effect is again uncertain. Video lottery may serve as a complement to or substitute for traditional lottery games. Indeed, video lottery has been very successful in these counties, garnishing more than $438 million in total sales or 2.75 times more than total traditional lottery sales in 2001. The issue is then whether the sales of traditional lottery games have been affected by the introduction of video lottery. To address this question, we include an indicator variable equal to one if a county offers video lottery and zero otherwise. Since three of the four counties that introduced video lottery are border counties, we also include an additional indicator variable that is equal to one if video lottery is introduced in a border county and thereafter and zero otherwise.
In 1992 West Virginia introduced Powerball. As discussed earlier, since border counties have market areas that extend into neighboring state territory, these counties are expected to generate relatively more revenues from the new game than the interior counties. We therefore also include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the county is a border county for all years following the introduction of Powerball in 1992 and zero otherwise to measure this effect. In some specifications we include a variable Traditional games include all instant, number and online games excluding video lottery. 
Lottery, Lottery Game, and Border Variables
At the heart of our analysis are a series of indicator variables designed to capture the effects of neighboring state lottery game introduction. As noted in Table 2 Table 2 .
Method of Analysis
We use regression analysis to estimate the determinants of the natural logarithm of real per capita lottery sales. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, several econometric issues warrant discussion.
The data are a panel of 770 observations that include all counties for years 1987 through 2000. Two conventional approaches for estimating panel data are the fixed-effects and random-effects procedures. However, if the individual county fixed-effects are correlated with other exogenous variables, the random-effects estimation procedure yields inconsistent estimates. A Hausman test shows that the fixed county-effects are correlated with the other exogenous variables, which suggests that the fixed-effects estimation procedure is more appropriate for this analysis. On a theoretical basis, a fixed-effects technique is more appropriate because the data are a panel of all counties and not a sampling of counties. Therefore, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, we use the fixed-effects procedure. One approach to estimating the two-way fixed-effects model is to include a set of county and time indicator variables in the specification. The fixed-effects estimator uses a weighted average of the within county variation and the between county variation net of statewide trends to form the parameter estimates.
Given the panel nature of our data, we must also address the potential for serial correlation of errors as well as spatial autocorrelation. A Durbin-Watson test indicates that autocorrelation is a concern; therefore, all standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation. With the exception of Case (1991 Case ( , 1992 , Case, et al. (1993) , Ohsawa (1999) , and Garrett and Marsh (2002) , to our knowledge models of spatial dependence have not been widely used in the public finance arena. First introduced by Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988) , models of spatial dependence account for any direct influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, and externalities generated between cross-sectional observations (in this research the unit of observation is counties). Failing to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, inefficient, and/or inconsistent coefficient estimates.
In order to test for spatial autocorrelation in the data, we conducted diagnostic tests for various cross-sections of the panel. For this, we created a spatial weights matrix that shows the presence of potential spatial interaction between neighboring counties. We ran diagnostic tests for both the spatial error and spatial lag models (Anselin et al., 1996) . In a spatial error model there is an autoregressive process in the error term, whereas a spatial lag model assumes a spatially lagged dependent variable. Lagrange multiplier test statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that autoregressive parameters are equal to zero. 9 The null hypothesis is rejected for cross-sections in various years, indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation.
Spatial dependence is caused by the existence of spillover effects between units of observation (counties) and the presence of a direct influence from activity in one county on neighboring counties. In this case, it may be that lottery sales in one county affect lottery sales in neighboring counties. For example, changes in advertising, number of outlets, changes in income, etc., in one county could affect sales in neighboring counties. We therefore use appropriate techniques to correct for spatial autocorrelation.
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Estimation Results
In Table 4 we present the results for a series of regressions designed to measure the effects of new neighboring state lotteries or lottery game introductions on lottery sales in border counties. In columns (1)- (3) we present the series of dummy variables described above to evaluate the border effects. Consider first column (1) Anselin et al. (1996) for a detailed explanation of these tests. 10 For more detail on the econometric issues involved in addressing spatial dependence, we refer readers to Garrett and March (2002) . Garrett and Marsh (2002) use cross-sectional variation lottery sales to generate the parameter estimates, and, thus, spatial dependence is critical to their analysis. In our analysis, we use panel data so that the parameter estimates are generated primarily from the within county variation in lottery sales. In this context serial correlation of error is likely a more serious concern. Nevertheless, we correct for spatial autocorrelation using STATA's "panel corrected standard error" panel regression option. Beck and Katz (1995) provide a detailed description of the panel corrected standard error estimation method and how it deals with the contemporaneous correlation of errors. 11 Here and in all other dummy variable coefficient interpretations, percentage change in lottery sales is calculated using the formula, (e γ -1)*100, where γ is the coefficient of the dummy variable. Columns (4)- (6) present the results from the variables that measure the cumulative effects of border state competition over time. Column (4) shows that in the fifth year following the introduction of a new lottery or lottery game in a neighboring state, border county losses tally to 30.5 percent. Column (5) is positive and significant, indicating that WV lottery sales increased in border counties adjacent to Virginia in the years following Virginia's introduction of Big Game. This result contradicts the finding from column (3) indicating that on average sales declined in West Virginia counties bordering Virginia following Virginia's introduction of Big Game. Generally, these estimates indicate that in some cases allowing for the effects to change over time provides a better estimate of the border effects, and that the estimated effects are larger than the estimates generated from the indicator variables.
If we consider the results from columns (3) and (6) together, we observe significant border effects in four of the five neighboring state lottery or lottery game introductions. In column (3), we observe significant effects in West Virginia border counties for the introduction of Powerball in Kentucky and Big Game in Virginia. In column (6), we observe significant cumulative effects in West Virginia border counties for the introduction of a new lottery in Virginia and Big Game in Maryland.
We also explored the possibility that the initial reaction to a new competing game is strong, but the effect diminishes the longer the new game is in place, but found no evidence of diminishing effects over time. Generally, we estimated a number of regressions that allowed for non-linearities between lottery sales and new neighboring state lottery game introduction. While we did find limited evidence of a non-linear relationship, the estimated effects generated from those regressions are not notably different from those presented here.
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The coefficients on the other variables generally yield the expected sign and statistical significance. The coefficient on income is positive, demonstrating that lottery sales increase by as much as 58 percent (column (6) of Table 4) when income increases by 100 percent, and vice versa. This relatively inelastic estimate is much smaller than Mikesell's (1994) estimate of 3.9. Our inelastic estimate is more consistent with the demonstrated regressive nature of lottery sales. Unlike the positive 12 We examined potential nonlinear relationships in several ways. First, we considered the possibility that the cumulative effects of lottery introduction in neighboring states would diminish over time. We therefore estimated a series of regressions in which we included the 1 plus the natural logarithm of the number of years following neighboring state lottery introduction to account for the diminishing effect. The estimated magnitude of the effects is similar to those presented here. Second, we estimated a regression in which we included both the number of years following a neighboring state lottery introduction and the square of number of years following a neighboring state lottery introduction. Again, the estimated magnitude of the effects is similar to those reported here. Lastly, we estimated a series of regressions in which we included both a dummy variable indicating that a neighboring state has introduced a new lottery or lottery game and a variable marking the time of new lottery or lottery game introduction in the neighboring state. Again, these estimates yield estimated effects similar to those presented here. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. and significant effect estimated by Mikesell (1994), we find no significant effect of the unemployment rate on lottery sales. Turning to the demographic variables, the only factor that is significant is the proportion of the population over the age of 65; an increase in this variable leads to an increase in lottery sales. This finding is inconsistent with our expectation. However, the elderly do have, on average, a higher level of disposable income and have more leisure time than do young and middle-aged adults. 13 The introduction of video lottery in racetracks in three West Virginia border counties served to increase traditional lottery sales in those counties. However, it appears that in the one West Virginia non-border county in which video lottery was introduced traditional lottery revenue actually fell following video lottery introduction. Thus, video lottery has served to attract new players from neighboring states in border counties, but in the interior county video lottery served as a substitute for traditional lottery games. Column (6) shows that the increase in traditional lottery sales in West Virginia border counties with video lottery was $56 million or about $8 million per year after 1994. However, when the four counties with video lottery are considered together, estimates show that traditional lottery sales decreased by $38 million or about $5.5 million per year after 1994. These results are consistent with the border-effect hypothesis as well as the negative impacts of casinos and pari-mutuel betting on state lottery revenues estimated by Elliott and Navin (2002 Virginia (1996) , and Big Game in Maryland (1997) . The coefficient estimates reported in Table 4 , column (3) show that the magnitude of the effects associated with these game adoptions decrease from the earliest adoption by Kentucky to a later adoption by Virginia. This is consistent with Mikesell's finding that lottery sales "decay" with the age of the lottery program (Mikesell, 1994) . One possible implication is that Pennsylvania's adoption of Powerball in 2002 may not have as large an impact on West Virginia border county sales as Kentucky's adop- 13 The other demographic variables are insignificant because there is little within state variation in these variables. Using a random-effects estimation technique, which relies more on the cross-county variation to form the parameter estimates, yields coefficients on the demographic variables that are more consistent with previous studies. 14 We note, however, that column (1) indicates that border counties experienced reduced sales following the introduction of Powerball, but the result is not robust. Finally, West Virginia's lottery game structure has changed significantly with the introduction of video lottery terminals in four racetracks starting in 1994. This change caused a substantial increase in both total lottery sales (including video lottery) and also in traditional lottery sales in border counties (excluding video lottery). As discussed in the previous section, video lottery complements other lottery games in West Virginia in border counties. It is expected that surrounding states may also start video lottery programs soon. While the findings presented in this paper cannot be used to generate a possible range of estimates for this effect, the impact is expected to be substantial given the fact that the West Virginia video lottery program had a statistically and economically significant positive effect on lottery sales (excluding video lottery) in the West Virginia border counties that introduced video lottery.
In this paper we use panel data from 55 West Virginia counties over the period 1987 through 2000 to estimate the effects of the introduction of new lotteries and lottery games on lottery sales. Our primary contribution is that we estimate the effects of border state competition in a dynamic framework. The use of panel data allows us to examine how lottery sales change as new competing lottery games are introduced. To our knowledge, this is the first study to utilize panel data to examine the dynamic nature of cross-border shopping, and thus contributes both to the literature on lotteries and more broadly to the literature on cross-border shopping. We find that new lottery introduction in Virginia and new lottery game introduction (Powerball and Big Game) in Kentucky, Virginia, and Maryland resulted in significant border county sales reductions. These results provide compelling evidence of border-shopping, and that the introduction of competing games can have a significant effect on lottery revenues, particularly in states like West Virginia that rely relatively heavily on sales to consumers who live in neighboring states.
